Afghanistan

The big afghanistan review is out from general mcchrystal and unfortunately it is exactly what I expected, and the lessons of general patreus have been fully internalized among the current crop of combatant commanders.

The old saying goes when you have a hammer every problem looks like a nail. Well, our services (or at least the army and marines) have discovered the screw driver. Unfortunately they haven't realized it can be turned in either direction.

In afghanistan the problems are that the government is too corrupt, the afghan forces are not combat effective, afghan/coalition troops are unable to provide population security in regions with taliban forces, coalition troops keep killing civilians and alienating the population, and there is uncertainty about our level of commitment. The solution (according to mcchrystal) is more resources for the afghan government (more money to skim), increased training for afghan forces, and more coalition troops (which may help immediately with population security but will also increase the pace of civilian casualties and increase incertainty of our role over the long term - see Vietnam). This somehow constitutes a new "strategy," even though he concedes we are already doing all of these things. Somehow doing them "more aggressively" will be "revolutionary to our effectiveness".

Later, mcchrystal writes about the need to "redefine both the fight itself and what we need for it." But again, there is nothing new here other than the need for even more troops. Yet over the past year, as the number of troops has already risen by tens of thousands, we have been going backwards. It is in the face of these troop increases that we land upon this decisive moment. And in response all we get is something that reads like a mckinsey report; as though using words like innovative, improve, and strategy in concert with new, redouble, and change has the capacity to unilateraly shift the so-called "center of gravity".

The report does have a useful analysis section. It breaks down the insurgency into three groups. It makes the important connection that the Taliban's strength draws primarily from the fact that they are not corrupt and unaccountable like the central government, that they realize they cannot reclaim control while the country is occupied by a substantial ISAF force, and that they are at most nominally allied with "al qaeda" for pragmatic reasons. But it then casts aside these important nuggets of insight with empty talk about how, somehow, bringing in the 101st airborne division will make the afghan government less corrupt. Worse, it suggests that the ISAF forces should be given more money and autonomy to buy off locals with economic support, which only exacerbates the lack of coordination, undermines the government, and increases the opportunities for corruption.

The fatal flaw of the plan lies in the hubris of the plans author. To hear the man previously charged with running our dark prisons talk about the need to change the "opeational culture" is disturbing on a moral level. But more so, all his discussions of "aligning" (i.e. unifying) the various commands in play and stepping up the operational tempo against the Taliban while simultaneously making friends assumes a totally unrealistic level of judgement, control, and opportunity by every grunt out in the mud.

I am impressed by how thoroughly mcchrystal deploys the term "failure". It is everywhere, imminent, and always paired with our choices. This goes back to the lessons of patreus. Make anything other than your options equal "defeat" and hide behind your uniform. If there is anyone americans respect it is the uniformed services, and if there is anything we hate it is losing. The result is you can back even the president into a corner with no where to go but for your plan.