Getting the Moderates Onboard

I am someone who is pretty stubborn in his principles and self assuredness, so I can appreciate the continuing holdout by folks like Blanche Lincoln and Ben Nelson on health care. But if I were Harry Reid trying to whip up the last of the democratic votes for the impending bill this is how I would approach it.

I think a commitment to bipartisanship is important. But it must be shared by both parties or it become a case of bargaining against oneself and gamesmanship. The republicans in the gang of six - except possibly olympia snowe, but I'm still not even sure of that - have spent the past few months mocking kent conrad and max baucus. Despite his giving them every opportunity to participate to the point of excluding democratic voices, they were in front of cameras making a mockery of the only man willing to give them a voice and a pen.

Why were they able to do this?  Because they assumed that a hand outstreched in friendship is incapable of being retracted. And in doing so they took that goodwill and dedication to doing the right thing for the American people - the most sacred task of those wise men and women we send forward - for granted. Rather than participate, they have abdicated.

And thus, with the cecession of the republican party from our governance, the only remaining partner for moderates to negotiate with is senators rockefeller, schumer, and the progressive wing of their own party. Within that dynamic the end result is much further from ben nelson's beliefs than our traditional orientation.

So, participating in the republican ruse on health care may better align the outcome of this bill with their moderate beliefs. But enabling them to walk a path to irrelevance may be even more dangerous to achieving their vision on the great work that is still to come.

Posted via email from dmaten

The Public Option

Some folks are now reporting that Senator Reid si going to kill the public option from the Senate health care bill. At the same time, CBO has come out with a score for the two public options and found a strong one would save $110b over ten years (and a weak one $25b).

How does a public option save money? Basically it would reduce the amount of subsidies we need to give out by driving down the cost of insurance through increased competition. With that in play, it seems like a pretty easy middle ground would be to put in place a trigger that if in five years private insurers hadn't bent the curve such that subsidies are $11b a year lower than projected then the public option would kick in. Obviously the devil is in the details, and you would need to keep the heat on. But essentially it is a you find it or we will kind of ultimatum.

Make sense or am I missing something?

Social Media

I am sure someone else has already come up with this, but just as a self reminder of a random thought I had this morning. While social media is new, social marketing has been around forever. Just think of those sunday afternoon football parties at bars sponsored by budweiser around the country. The aim is to create a venue for social interactions, generate some fun for those who meander in, then hope they link that the ad signs on the wall and the occasional free beers they get from the girls in tight outfits.  Maybe even do some fun branded games or get some marketing research.

With social media it is the same thing. It is all about creating a playground for people to come. Then worry about getting your message through, because if it isn't fun nobody will come anyway.

Posted via email from dmaten

Afghanistan

The big afghanistan review is out from general mcchrystal and unfortunately it is exactly what I expected, and the lessons of general patreus have been fully internalized among the current crop of combatant commanders.

The old saying goes when you have a hammer every problem looks like a nail. Well, our services (or at least the army and marines) have discovered the screw driver. Unfortunately they haven't realized it can be turned in either direction.

In afghanistan the problems are that the government is too corrupt, the afghan forces are not combat effective, afghan/coalition troops are unable to provide population security in regions with taliban forces, coalition troops keep killing civilians and alienating the population, and there is uncertainty about our level of commitment. The solution (according to mcchrystal) is more resources for the afghan government (more money to skim), increased training for afghan forces, and more coalition troops (which may help immediately with population security but will also increase the pace of civilian casualties and increase incertainty of our role over the long term - see Vietnam). This somehow constitutes a new "strategy," even though he concedes we are already doing all of these things. Somehow doing them "more aggressively" will be "revolutionary to our effectiveness".

Later, mcchrystal writes about the need to "redefine both the fight itself and what we need for it." But again, there is nothing new here other than the need for even more troops. Yet over the past year, as the number of troops has already risen by tens of thousands, we have been going backwards. It is in the face of these troop increases that we land upon this decisive moment. And in response all we get is something that reads like a mckinsey report; as though using words like innovative, improve, and strategy in concert with new, redouble, and change has the capacity to unilateraly shift the so-called "center of gravity".

The report does have a useful analysis section. It breaks down the insurgency into three groups. It makes the important connection that the Taliban's strength draws primarily from the fact that they are not corrupt and unaccountable like the central government, that they realize they cannot reclaim control while the country is occupied by a substantial ISAF force, and that they are at most nominally allied with "al qaeda" for pragmatic reasons. But it then casts aside these important nuggets of insight with empty talk about how, somehow, bringing in the 101st airborne division will make the afghan government less corrupt. Worse, it suggests that the ISAF forces should be given more money and autonomy to buy off locals with economic support, which only exacerbates the lack of coordination, undermines the government, and increases the opportunities for corruption.

The fatal flaw of the plan lies in the hubris of the plans author. To hear the man previously charged with running our dark prisons talk about the need to change the "opeational culture" is disturbing on a moral level. But more so, all his discussions of "aligning" (i.e. unifying) the various commands in play and stepping up the operational tempo against the Taliban while simultaneously making friends assumes a totally unrealistic level of judgement, control, and opportunity by every grunt out in the mud.

I am impressed by how thoroughly mcchrystal deploys the term "failure". It is everywhere, imminent, and always paired with our choices. This goes back to the lessons of patreus. Make anything other than your options equal "defeat" and hide behind your uniform. If there is anyone americans respect it is the uniformed services, and if there is anything we hate it is losing. The result is you can back even the president into a corner with no where to go but for your plan.